Files
android_kernel_motorola_sm6225/include/linux/fscrypt.h
T
Ivaylo Georgiev a025b6c910 Merge android-4.19.78 (75337a6) into msm-4.19
* refs/heads/tmp-75337a6:
  ANDROID: usb: gadget: Fix dependency for f_accessory
  ANDROID: properly export new symbols with _GPL tag
  UPSTREAM: mm/kasan: fix false positive invalid-free reports with CONFIG_KASAN_SW_TAGS=y
  UPSTREAM: kasan: initialize tag to 0xff in __kasan_kmalloc
  UPSTREAM: x86/boot: Provide KASAN compatible aliases for string routines
  UPSTREAM: x86/uaccess, kasan: Fix KASAN vs SMAP
  BACKPORT: x86/uaccess: Introduce user_access_{save,restore}()
  UPSTREAM: kasan: fix variable 'tag' set but not used warning
  UPSTREAM: Revert "x86_64: Increase stack size for KASAN_EXTRA"
  UPSTREAM: kasan: fix coccinelle warnings in kasan_p*_table
  UPSTREAM: kasan: fix kasan_check_read/write definitions
  BACKPORT: kasan: remove use after scope bugs detection.
  BACKPORT: kasan: turn off asan-stack for clang-8 and earlier
  UPSTREAM: slub: fix a crash with SLUB_DEBUG + KASAN_SW_TAGS
  UPSTREAM: kasan, slab: remove redundant kasan_slab_alloc hooks
  UPSTREAM: kasan, slab: make freelist stored without tags
  UPSTREAM: kasan, slab: fix conflicts with CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY
  UPSTREAM: kasan: prevent tracing of tags.c
  UPSTREAM: kasan: fix random seed generation for tag-based mode
  UPSTREAM: slub: fix SLAB_CONSISTENCY_CHECKS + KASAN_SW_TAGS
  UPSTREAM: kasan, slub: fix more conflicts with CONFIG_SLAB_FREELIST_HARDENED
  UPSTREAM: kasan, slub: fix conflicts with CONFIG_SLAB_FREELIST_HARDENED
  UPSTREAM: kasan, slub: move kasan_poison_slab hook before page_address
  UPSTREAM: kasan, kmemleak: pass tagged pointers to kmemleak
  UPSTREAM: kasan: fix assigning tags twice
  UPSTREAM: kasan: mark file common so ftrace doesn't trace it
  UPSTREAM: kasan, arm64: remove redundant ARCH_SLAB_MINALIGN define
  UPSTREAM: kasan: fix krealloc handling for tag-based mode
  UPSTREAM: kasan: make tag based mode work with CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY
  UPSTREAM: kasan, arm64: use ARCH_SLAB_MINALIGN instead of manual aligning
  BACKPORT: mm/memblock.c: skip kmemleak for kasan_init()
  UPSTREAM: kasan: add SPDX-License-Identifier mark to source files
  UPSTREAM: kasan: update documentation
  UPSTREAM: kasan, arm64: select HAVE_ARCH_KASAN_SW_TAGS
  UPSTREAM: kasan: add __must_check annotations to kasan hooks
  UPSTREAM: kasan, mm, arm64: tag non slab memory allocated via pagealloc
  UPSTREAM: kasan, arm64: add brk handler for inline instrumentation
  UPSTREAM: kasan: add hooks implementation for tag-based mode
  UPSTREAM: mm: move obj_to_index to include/linux/slab_def.h
  UPSTREAM: kasan: add bug reporting routines for tag-based mode
  UPSTREAM: kasan: split out generic_report.c from report.c
  UPSTREAM: kasan, mm: perform untagged pointers comparison in krealloc
  BACKPORT: kasan, arm64: enable top byte ignore for the kernel
  BACKPORT: kasan, arm64: fix up fault handling logic
  UPSTREAM: kasan: preassign tags to objects with ctors or SLAB_TYPESAFE_BY_RCU
  UPSTREAM: kasan, arm64: untag address in _virt_addr_is_linear
  UPSTREAM: kasan: add tag related helper functions
  UPSTREAM: arm64: move untagged_addr macro from uaccess.h to memory.h
  BACKPORT: kasan: initialize shadow to 0xff for tag-based mode
  BACKPORT: kasan: rename kasan_zero_page to kasan_early_shadow_page
  UPSTREAM: kasan, arm64: adjust shadow size for tag-based mode
  BACKPORT: kasan: add CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC and CONFIG_KASAN_SW_TAGS
  UPSTREAM: kasan: rename source files to reflect the new naming scheme
  UPSTREAM: kasan: move common generic and tag-based code to common.c
  UPSTREAM: kasan, slub: handle pointer tags in early_kmem_cache_node_alloc
  UPSTREAM: kasan, mm: change hooks signatures
  UPSTREAM: arm64: add EXPORT_SYMBOL_NOKASAN()
  BACKPORT: compiler: remove __no_sanitize_address_or_inline again
  UPSTREAM: mm/kasan/quarantine.c: make quarantine_lock a raw_spinlock_t
  UPSTREAM: lib/test_kasan.c: add tests for several string/memory API functions
  UPSTREAM: arm64: lib: use C string functions with KASAN enabled
  UPSTREAM: compiler: introduce __no_sanitize_address_or_inline
  UPSTREAM: arm64: Fix typo in a comment in arch/arm64/mm/kasan_init.c
  ANDROID: enable CONFIG_ION_SYSTEM_HEAP for GKI
  Update ABI definition after libabigail upgrade
  ANDROID: update abi due to 4.19.75 changes
  ANDROID: Remove CONFIG_USELIB from x86 gki config
  ANDROID: net: enable wireless core features with GKI_LEGACY_WEXT_ALLCONFIG
  ANDROID: arm64: bpf: implement arch_bpf_jit_check_func
  ANDROID: bpf: validate bpf_func when BPF_JIT is enabled with CFI
  UPSTREAM: kcm: use BPF_PROG_RUN
  ANDROID: gki_defconfig: CONFIG_MMC_BLOCK=m
  UPSTREAM: psi: get poll_work to run when calling poll syscall next time
  UPSTREAM: sched/psi: Do not require setsched permission from the trigger creator
  UPSTREAM: sched/psi: Reduce psimon FIFO priority
  ANDROID: gki_defconfig: Enable HiSilicon SoCs
  UPSTREAM: PCI: kirin: Fix section mismatch warning
  ANDROID: gki_defconfig: Enable SERIAL_DEV_BUS
  ANDROID: gki_defconfig: Add GKI_HACKS_to_FIX config
  ANDROID: init: GKI: enable hidden configs for GPIO
  ANDROID: init: GKI: enable hidden configs for SND_SOC
  ANDROID: init: GKI: enable hidden configs for regmap
  ANDROID: init: GKI: enable hidden configs for DRM
  ANDROID: init: GKI: add GKI_HACKS_TO_FIX
  ABI: Update ABI after fscrypto merge
  ANDROID: gki_defconfig: enable CONFIG_UIO
  UPSTREAM: ALSA: pcm: add support for 352.8KHz and 384KHz sample rate
  ANDROID: Log which device failed to suspend in dpm_suspend_start()
  UPSTREAM: arm64: Add support for relocating the kernel with RELR relocations
  ANDROID: update ABI after CONFIG_MMC=m
  CONFIG_MMC=m
  ABI: Update ABI for LTS, 8250 changes
  ANDROID: Removed extraneous serial 8250 configs
  Adding SERIAL_OF_PLATFORM module to gki
  fscrypt: document testing with xfstests
  fscrypt: remove selection of CONFIG_CRYPTO_SHA256
  fscrypt: remove unnecessary includes of ratelimit.h
  fscrypt: don't set policy for a dead directory
  fscrypt: decrypt only the needed blocks in __fscrypt_decrypt_bio()
  fscrypt: support decrypting multiple filesystem blocks per page
  fscrypt: introduce fscrypt_decrypt_block_inplace()
  fscrypt: handle blocksize < PAGE_SIZE in fscrypt_zeroout_range()
  fscrypt: support encrypting multiple filesystem blocks per page
  fscrypt: introduce fscrypt_encrypt_block_inplace()
  fscrypt: clean up some BUG_ON()s in block encryption/decryption
  fscrypt: rename fscrypt_do_page_crypto() to fscrypt_crypt_block()
  fscrypt: remove the "write" part of struct fscrypt_ctx
  fscrypt: simplify bounce page handling

Conflicts:
	arch/Kconfig
	fs/crypto/bio.c
	fs/ext4/page-io.c
	fs/f2fs/data.c
	fs/f2fs/f2fs.h
	fs/f2fs/super.c
	include/linux/fscrypt.h
	sound/core/pcm_native.c

Change-Id: Ia94ba2ae85e04be9f69115e2da2d69d0dc76545f
Signed-off-by: Ivaylo Georgiev <irgeorgiev@codeaurora.org>
2020-03-16 23:09:43 -07:00

754 lines
24 KiB
C

/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
/*
* fscrypt.h: declarations for per-file encryption
*
* Filesystems that implement per-file encryption must include this header
* file.
*
* Copyright (C) 2015, Google, Inc.
*
* Written by Michael Halcrow, 2015.
* Modified by Jaegeuk Kim, 2015.
*/
#ifndef _LINUX_FSCRYPT_H
#define _LINUX_FSCRYPT_H
#include <linux/fs.h>
#include <linux/mm.h>
#include <linux/slab.h>
#define FS_CRYPTO_BLOCK_SIZE 16
struct fscrypt_ctx;
/* iv sector for security/pfe/pfk_fscrypt.c and f2fs */
#define PG_DUN(i, p) \
(((((u64)(i)->i_ino) & 0xffffffff) << 32) | ((p)->index & 0xffffffff))
struct fscrypt_info;
struct fscrypt_str {
unsigned char *name;
u32 len;
};
struct fscrypt_name {
const struct qstr *usr_fname;
struct fscrypt_str disk_name;
u32 hash;
u32 minor_hash;
struct fscrypt_str crypto_buf;
bool is_ciphertext_name;
};
#define FSTR_INIT(n, l) { .name = n, .len = l }
#define FSTR_TO_QSTR(f) QSTR_INIT((f)->name, (f)->len)
#define fname_name(p) ((p)->disk_name.name)
#define fname_len(p) ((p)->disk_name.len)
/* Maximum value for the third parameter of fscrypt_operations.set_context(). */
#define FSCRYPT_SET_CONTEXT_MAX_SIZE 28
#ifdef CONFIG_FS_ENCRYPTION
/*
* fscrypt superblock flags
*/
#define FS_CFLG_OWN_PAGES (1U << 1)
/*
* crypto operations for filesystems
*/
struct fscrypt_operations {
unsigned int flags;
const char *key_prefix;
int (*get_context)(struct inode *, void *, size_t);
int (*set_context)(struct inode *, const void *, size_t, void *);
bool (*dummy_context)(struct inode *);
bool (*empty_dir)(struct inode *);
unsigned int max_namelen;
bool (*is_encrypted)(struct inode *inode);
};
/* Decryption work */
struct fscrypt_ctx {
union {
struct {
struct bio *bio;
struct work_struct work;
};
struct list_head free_list; /* Free list */
};
u8 flags; /* Flags */
};
static inline bool fscrypt_has_encryption_key(const struct inode *inode)
{
/* pairs with cmpxchg_release() in fscrypt_get_encryption_info() */
return READ_ONCE(inode->i_crypt_info) != NULL;
}
static inline bool fscrypt_dummy_context_enabled(struct inode *inode)
{
return inode->i_sb->s_cop->dummy_context &&
inode->i_sb->s_cop->dummy_context(inode);
}
/*
* When d_splice_alias() moves a directory's encrypted alias to its decrypted
* alias as a result of the encryption key being added, DCACHE_ENCRYPTED_NAME
* must be cleared. Note that we don't have to support arbitrary moves of this
* flag because fscrypt doesn't allow encrypted aliases to be the source or
* target of a rename().
*/
static inline void fscrypt_handle_d_move(struct dentry *dentry)
{
dentry->d_flags &= ~DCACHE_ENCRYPTED_NAME;
}
/* crypto.c */
extern void fscrypt_enqueue_decrypt_work(struct work_struct *);
extern struct fscrypt_ctx *fscrypt_get_ctx(gfp_t);
extern void fscrypt_release_ctx(struct fscrypt_ctx *);
extern struct page *fscrypt_encrypt_pagecache_blocks(struct page *page,
unsigned int len,
unsigned int offs,
gfp_t gfp_flags);
extern int fscrypt_encrypt_block_inplace(const struct inode *inode,
struct page *page, unsigned int len,
unsigned int offs, u64 lblk_num,
gfp_t gfp_flags);
extern int fscrypt_decrypt_pagecache_blocks(struct page *page, unsigned int len,
unsigned int offs);
extern int fscrypt_decrypt_block_inplace(const struct inode *inode,
struct page *page, unsigned int len,
unsigned int offs, u64 lblk_num);
static inline bool fscrypt_is_bounce_page(struct page *page)
{
return page->mapping == NULL;
}
static inline struct page *fscrypt_pagecache_page(struct page *bounce_page)
{
return (struct page *)page_private(bounce_page);
}
extern void fscrypt_free_bounce_page(struct page *bounce_page);
/* policy.c */
extern int fscrypt_ioctl_set_policy(struct file *, const void __user *);
extern int fscrypt_ioctl_get_policy(struct file *, void __user *);
extern int fscrypt_has_permitted_context(struct inode *, struct inode *);
extern int fscrypt_inherit_context(struct inode *, struct inode *,
void *, bool);
/* keyinfo.c */
extern int fscrypt_get_encryption_info(struct inode *);
extern void fscrypt_put_encryption_info(struct inode *);
extern void fscrypt_free_inode(struct inode *);
/* fname.c */
extern int fscrypt_setup_filename(struct inode *, const struct qstr *,
int lookup, struct fscrypt_name *);
static inline void fscrypt_free_filename(struct fscrypt_name *fname)
{
kfree(fname->crypto_buf.name);
}
extern int fscrypt_fname_alloc_buffer(const struct inode *, u32,
struct fscrypt_str *);
extern void fscrypt_fname_free_buffer(struct fscrypt_str *);
extern int fscrypt_fname_disk_to_usr(struct inode *, u32, u32,
const struct fscrypt_str *, struct fscrypt_str *);
#define FSCRYPT_FNAME_MAX_UNDIGESTED_SIZE 32
/* Extracts the second-to-last ciphertext block; see explanation below */
#define FSCRYPT_FNAME_DIGEST(name, len) \
((name) + round_down((len) - FS_CRYPTO_BLOCK_SIZE - 1, \
FS_CRYPTO_BLOCK_SIZE))
#define FSCRYPT_FNAME_DIGEST_SIZE FS_CRYPTO_BLOCK_SIZE
/**
* fscrypt_digested_name - alternate identifier for an on-disk filename
*
* When userspace lists an encrypted directory without access to the key,
* filenames whose ciphertext is longer than FSCRYPT_FNAME_MAX_UNDIGESTED_SIZE
* bytes are shown in this abbreviated form (base64-encoded) rather than as the
* full ciphertext (base64-encoded). This is necessary to allow supporting
* filenames up to NAME_MAX bytes, since base64 encoding expands the length.
*
* To make it possible for filesystems to still find the correct directory entry
* despite not knowing the full on-disk name, we encode any filesystem-specific
* 'hash' and/or 'minor_hash' which the filesystem may need for its lookups,
* followed by the second-to-last ciphertext block of the filename. Due to the
* use of the CBC-CTS encryption mode, the second-to-last ciphertext block
* depends on the full plaintext. (Note that ciphertext stealing causes the
* last two blocks to appear "flipped".) This makes accidental collisions very
* unlikely: just a 1 in 2^128 chance for two filenames to collide even if they
* share the same filesystem-specific hashes.
*
* However, this scheme isn't immune to intentional collisions, which can be
* created by anyone able to create arbitrary plaintext filenames and view them
* without the key. Making the "digest" be a real cryptographic hash like
* SHA-256 over the full ciphertext would prevent this, although it would be
* less efficient and harder to implement, especially since the filesystem would
* need to calculate it for each directory entry examined during a search.
*/
struct fscrypt_digested_name {
u32 hash;
u32 minor_hash;
u8 digest[FSCRYPT_FNAME_DIGEST_SIZE];
};
/**
* fscrypt_match_name() - test whether the given name matches a directory entry
* @fname: the name being searched for
* @de_name: the name from the directory entry
* @de_name_len: the length of @de_name in bytes
*
* Normally @fname->disk_name will be set, and in that case we simply compare
* that to the name stored in the directory entry. The only exception is that
* if we don't have the key for an encrypted directory and a filename in it is
* very long, then we won't have the full disk_name and we'll instead need to
* match against the fscrypt_digested_name.
*
* Return: %true if the name matches, otherwise %false.
*/
static inline bool fscrypt_match_name(const struct fscrypt_name *fname,
const u8 *de_name, u32 de_name_len)
{
if (unlikely(!fname->disk_name.name)) {
const struct fscrypt_digested_name *n =
(const void *)fname->crypto_buf.name;
if (WARN_ON_ONCE(fname->usr_fname->name[0] != '_'))
return false;
if (de_name_len <= FSCRYPT_FNAME_MAX_UNDIGESTED_SIZE)
return false;
return !memcmp(FSCRYPT_FNAME_DIGEST(de_name, de_name_len),
n->digest, FSCRYPT_FNAME_DIGEST_SIZE);
}
if (de_name_len != fname->disk_name.len)
return false;
return !memcmp(de_name, fname->disk_name.name, fname->disk_name.len);
}
/* bio.c */
extern void fscrypt_decrypt_bio(struct bio *);
extern void fscrypt_enqueue_decrypt_bio(struct fscrypt_ctx *ctx,
struct bio *bio);
extern int fscrypt_zeroout_range(const struct inode *, pgoff_t, sector_t,
unsigned int);
/* hooks.c */
extern int fscrypt_file_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *filp);
extern int __fscrypt_prepare_link(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir,
struct dentry *dentry);
extern int __fscrypt_prepare_rename(struct inode *old_dir,
struct dentry *old_dentry,
struct inode *new_dir,
struct dentry *new_dentry,
unsigned int flags);
extern int __fscrypt_prepare_lookup(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry,
struct fscrypt_name *fname);
extern int __fscrypt_prepare_symlink(struct inode *dir, unsigned int len,
unsigned int max_len,
struct fscrypt_str *disk_link);
extern int __fscrypt_encrypt_symlink(struct inode *inode, const char *target,
unsigned int len,
struct fscrypt_str *disk_link);
extern const char *fscrypt_get_symlink(struct inode *inode, const void *caddr,
unsigned int max_size,
struct delayed_call *done);
#else /* !CONFIG_FS_ENCRYPTION */
static inline bool fscrypt_has_encryption_key(const struct inode *inode)
{
return false;
}
static inline bool fscrypt_dummy_context_enabled(struct inode *inode)
{
return false;
}
static inline void fscrypt_handle_d_move(struct dentry *dentry)
{
}
/* crypto.c */
static inline void fscrypt_enqueue_decrypt_work(struct work_struct *work)
{
}
static inline struct fscrypt_ctx *fscrypt_get_ctx(gfp_t gfp_flags)
{
return ERR_PTR(-EOPNOTSUPP);
}
static inline void fscrypt_release_ctx(struct fscrypt_ctx *ctx)
{
return;
}
static inline struct page *fscrypt_encrypt_pagecache_blocks(struct page *page,
unsigned int len,
unsigned int offs,
gfp_t gfp_flags)
{
return ERR_PTR(-EOPNOTSUPP);
}
static inline int fscrypt_encrypt_block_inplace(const struct inode *inode,
struct page *page,
unsigned int len,
unsigned int offs, u64 lblk_num,
gfp_t gfp_flags)
{
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
}
static inline int fscrypt_decrypt_pagecache_blocks(struct page *page,
unsigned int len,
unsigned int offs)
{
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
}
static inline int fscrypt_decrypt_block_inplace(const struct inode *inode,
struct page *page,
unsigned int len,
unsigned int offs, u64 lblk_num)
{
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
}
static inline bool fscrypt_is_bounce_page(struct page *page)
{
return false;
}
static inline struct page *fscrypt_pagecache_page(struct page *bounce_page)
{
WARN_ON_ONCE(1);
return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
}
static inline void fscrypt_free_bounce_page(struct page *bounce_page)
{
}
/* policy.c */
static inline int fscrypt_ioctl_set_policy(struct file *filp,
const void __user *arg)
{
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
}
static inline int fscrypt_ioctl_get_policy(struct file *filp, void __user *arg)
{
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
}
static inline int fscrypt_has_permitted_context(struct inode *parent,
struct inode *child)
{
return 0;
}
static inline int fscrypt_inherit_context(struct inode *parent,
struct inode *child,
void *fs_data, bool preload)
{
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
}
/* keyinfo.c */
static inline int fscrypt_get_encryption_info(struct inode *inode)
{
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
}
static inline void fscrypt_put_encryption_info(struct inode *inode)
{
return;
}
static inline void fscrypt_free_inode(struct inode *inode)
{
}
/* fname.c */
static inline int fscrypt_setup_filename(struct inode *dir,
const struct qstr *iname,
int lookup, struct fscrypt_name *fname)
{
if (IS_ENCRYPTED(dir))
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
memset(fname, 0, sizeof(*fname));
fname->usr_fname = iname;
fname->disk_name.name = (unsigned char *)iname->name;
fname->disk_name.len = iname->len;
return 0;
}
static inline void fscrypt_free_filename(struct fscrypt_name *fname)
{
return;
}
static inline int fscrypt_fname_alloc_buffer(const struct inode *inode,
u32 max_encrypted_len,
struct fscrypt_str *crypto_str)
{
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
}
static inline void fscrypt_fname_free_buffer(struct fscrypt_str *crypto_str)
{
return;
}
static inline int fscrypt_fname_disk_to_usr(struct inode *inode,
u32 hash, u32 minor_hash,
const struct fscrypt_str *iname,
struct fscrypt_str *oname)
{
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
}
static inline bool fscrypt_match_name(const struct fscrypt_name *fname,
const u8 *de_name, u32 de_name_len)
{
/* Encryption support disabled; use standard comparison */
if (de_name_len != fname->disk_name.len)
return false;
return !memcmp(de_name, fname->disk_name.name, fname->disk_name.len);
}
/* bio.c */
static inline void fscrypt_decrypt_bio(struct bio *bio)
{
}
static inline void fscrypt_enqueue_decrypt_bio(struct fscrypt_ctx *ctx,
struct bio *bio)
{
}
static inline int fscrypt_zeroout_range(const struct inode *inode, pgoff_t lblk,
sector_t pblk, unsigned int len)
{
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
}
/* hooks.c */
static inline int fscrypt_file_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *filp)
{
if (IS_ENCRYPTED(inode))
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
return 0;
}
static inline int __fscrypt_prepare_link(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir,
struct dentry *dentry)
{
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
}
static inline int __fscrypt_prepare_rename(struct inode *old_dir,
struct dentry *old_dentry,
struct inode *new_dir,
struct dentry *new_dentry,
unsigned int flags)
{
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
}
static inline int __fscrypt_prepare_lookup(struct inode *dir,
struct dentry *dentry,
struct fscrypt_name *fname)
{
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
}
static inline int __fscrypt_prepare_symlink(struct inode *dir,
unsigned int len,
unsigned int max_len,
struct fscrypt_str *disk_link)
{
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
}
static inline int __fscrypt_encrypt_symlink(struct inode *inode,
const char *target,
unsigned int len,
struct fscrypt_str *disk_link)
{
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
}
static inline const char *fscrypt_get_symlink(struct inode *inode,
const void *caddr,
unsigned int max_size,
struct delayed_call *done)
{
return ERR_PTR(-EOPNOTSUPP);
}
#endif /* !CONFIG_FS_ENCRYPTION */
/**
* fscrypt_require_key - require an inode's encryption key
* @inode: the inode we need the key for
*
* If the inode is encrypted, set up its encryption key if not already done.
* Then require that the key be present and return -ENOKEY otherwise.
*
* No locks are needed, and the key will live as long as the struct inode --- so
* it won't go away from under you.
*
* Return: 0 on success, -ENOKEY if the key is missing, or another -errno code
* if a problem occurred while setting up the encryption key.
*/
static inline int fscrypt_require_key(struct inode *inode)
{
if (IS_ENCRYPTED(inode)) {
int err = fscrypt_get_encryption_info(inode);
if (err)
return err;
if (!fscrypt_has_encryption_key(inode))
return -ENOKEY;
}
return 0;
}
/**
* fscrypt_prepare_link - prepare to link an inode into a possibly-encrypted directory
* @old_dentry: an existing dentry for the inode being linked
* @dir: the target directory
* @dentry: negative dentry for the target filename
*
* A new link can only be added to an encrypted directory if the directory's
* encryption key is available --- since otherwise we'd have no way to encrypt
* the filename. Therefore, we first set up the directory's encryption key (if
* not already done) and return an error if it's unavailable.
*
* We also verify that the link will not violate the constraint that all files
* in an encrypted directory tree use the same encryption policy.
*
* Return: 0 on success, -ENOKEY if the directory's encryption key is missing,
* -EXDEV if the link would result in an inconsistent encryption policy, or
* another -errno code.
*/
static inline int fscrypt_prepare_link(struct dentry *old_dentry,
struct inode *dir,
struct dentry *dentry)
{
if (IS_ENCRYPTED(dir))
return __fscrypt_prepare_link(d_inode(old_dentry), dir, dentry);
return 0;
}
/**
* fscrypt_prepare_rename - prepare for a rename between possibly-encrypted directories
* @old_dir: source directory
* @old_dentry: dentry for source file
* @new_dir: target directory
* @new_dentry: dentry for target location (may be negative unless exchanging)
* @flags: rename flags (we care at least about %RENAME_EXCHANGE)
*
* Prepare for ->rename() where the source and/or target directories may be
* encrypted. A new link can only be added to an encrypted directory if the
* directory's encryption key is available --- since otherwise we'd have no way
* to encrypt the filename. A rename to an existing name, on the other hand,
* *is* cryptographically possible without the key. However, we take the more
* conservative approach and just forbid all no-key renames.
*
* We also verify that the rename will not violate the constraint that all files
* in an encrypted directory tree use the same encryption policy.
*
* Return: 0 on success, -ENOKEY if an encryption key is missing, -EXDEV if the
* rename would cause inconsistent encryption policies, or another -errno code.
*/
static inline int fscrypt_prepare_rename(struct inode *old_dir,
struct dentry *old_dentry,
struct inode *new_dir,
struct dentry *new_dentry,
unsigned int flags)
{
if (IS_ENCRYPTED(old_dir) || IS_ENCRYPTED(new_dir))
return __fscrypt_prepare_rename(old_dir, old_dentry,
new_dir, new_dentry, flags);
return 0;
}
/**
* fscrypt_prepare_lookup - prepare to lookup a name in a possibly-encrypted directory
* @dir: directory being searched
* @dentry: filename being looked up
* @fname: (output) the name to use to search the on-disk directory
*
* Prepare for ->lookup() in a directory which may be encrypted by determining
* the name that will actually be used to search the directory on-disk. Lookups
* can be done with or without the directory's encryption key; without the key,
* filenames are presented in encrypted form. Therefore, we'll try to set up
* the directory's encryption key, but even without it the lookup can continue.
*
* This also installs a custom ->d_revalidate() method which will invalidate the
* dentry if it was created without the key and the key is later added.
*
* Return: 0 on success; -ENOENT if key is unavailable but the filename isn't a
* correctly formed encoded ciphertext name, so a negative dentry should be
* created; or another -errno code.
*/
static inline int fscrypt_prepare_lookup(struct inode *dir,
struct dentry *dentry,
struct fscrypt_name *fname)
{
if (IS_ENCRYPTED(dir))
return __fscrypt_prepare_lookup(dir, dentry, fname);
memset(fname, 0, sizeof(*fname));
fname->usr_fname = &dentry->d_name;
fname->disk_name.name = (unsigned char *)dentry->d_name.name;
fname->disk_name.len = dentry->d_name.len;
return 0;
}
/**
* fscrypt_prepare_setattr - prepare to change a possibly-encrypted inode's attributes
* @dentry: dentry through which the inode is being changed
* @attr: attributes to change
*
* Prepare for ->setattr() on a possibly-encrypted inode. On an encrypted file,
* most attribute changes are allowed even without the encryption key. However,
* without the encryption key we do have to forbid truncates. This is needed
* because the size being truncated to may not be a multiple of the filesystem
* block size, and in that case we'd have to decrypt the final block, zero the
* portion past i_size, and re-encrypt it. (We *could* allow truncating to a
* filesystem block boundary, but it's simpler to just forbid all truncates ---
* and we already forbid all other contents modifications without the key.)
*
* Return: 0 on success, -ENOKEY if the key is missing, or another -errno code
* if a problem occurred while setting up the encryption key.
*/
static inline int fscrypt_prepare_setattr(struct dentry *dentry,
struct iattr *attr)
{
if (attr->ia_valid & ATTR_SIZE)
return fscrypt_require_key(d_inode(dentry));
return 0;
}
/**
* fscrypt_prepare_symlink - prepare to create a possibly-encrypted symlink
* @dir: directory in which the symlink is being created
* @target: plaintext symlink target
* @len: length of @target excluding null terminator
* @max_len: space the filesystem has available to store the symlink target
* @disk_link: (out) the on-disk symlink target being prepared
*
* This function computes the size the symlink target will require on-disk,
* stores it in @disk_link->len, and validates it against @max_len. An
* encrypted symlink may be longer than the original.
*
* Additionally, @disk_link->name is set to @target if the symlink will be
* unencrypted, but left NULL if the symlink will be encrypted. For encrypted
* symlinks, the filesystem must call fscrypt_encrypt_symlink() to create the
* on-disk target later. (The reason for the two-step process is that some
* filesystems need to know the size of the symlink target before creating the
* inode, e.g. to determine whether it will be a "fast" or "slow" symlink.)
*
* Return: 0 on success, -ENAMETOOLONG if the symlink target is too long,
* -ENOKEY if the encryption key is missing, or another -errno code if a problem
* occurred while setting up the encryption key.
*/
static inline int fscrypt_prepare_symlink(struct inode *dir,
const char *target,
unsigned int len,
unsigned int max_len,
struct fscrypt_str *disk_link)
{
if (IS_ENCRYPTED(dir) || fscrypt_dummy_context_enabled(dir))
return __fscrypt_prepare_symlink(dir, len, max_len, disk_link);
disk_link->name = (unsigned char *)target;
disk_link->len = len + 1;
if (disk_link->len > max_len)
return -ENAMETOOLONG;
return 0;
}
/**
* fscrypt_encrypt_symlink - encrypt the symlink target if needed
* @inode: symlink inode
* @target: plaintext symlink target
* @len: length of @target excluding null terminator
* @disk_link: (in/out) the on-disk symlink target being prepared
*
* If the symlink target needs to be encrypted, then this function encrypts it
* into @disk_link->name. fscrypt_prepare_symlink() must have been called
* previously to compute @disk_link->len. If the filesystem did not allocate a
* buffer for @disk_link->name after calling fscrypt_prepare_link(), then one
* will be kmalloc()'ed and the filesystem will be responsible for freeing it.
*
* Return: 0 on success, -errno on failure
*/
static inline int fscrypt_encrypt_symlink(struct inode *inode,
const char *target,
unsigned int len,
struct fscrypt_str *disk_link)
{
if (IS_ENCRYPTED(inode))
return __fscrypt_encrypt_symlink(inode, target, len, disk_link);
return 0;
}
/* fscrypt_ice.c */
#ifdef CONFIG_PFK
extern int fscrypt_using_hardware_encryption(const struct inode *inode);
extern void fscrypt_set_ice_dun(const struct inode *inode,
struct bio *bio, u64 dun);
extern void fscrypt_set_ice_skip(struct bio *bio, int bi_crypt_skip);
extern bool fscrypt_mergeable_bio(struct bio *bio, u64 dun, bool bio_encrypted,
int bi_crypt_skip);
#else
static inline int fscrypt_using_hardware_encryption(const struct inode *inode)
{
return 0;
}
static inline void fscrypt_set_ice_dun(const struct inode *inode,
struct bio *bio, u64 dun){}
static inline void fscrypt_set_ice_skip(struct bio *bio, int bi_crypt_skip)
{}
static inline bool fscrypt_mergeable_bio(struct bio *bio,
u64 dun, bool bio_encrypted, int bi_crypt_skip)
{
return true;
}
#endif
/* If *pagep is a bounce page, free it and set *pagep to the pagecache page */
static inline void fscrypt_finalize_bounce_page(struct page **pagep)
{
struct page *page = *pagep;
if (fscrypt_is_bounce_page(page)) {
*pagep = fscrypt_pagecache_page(page);
fscrypt_free_bounce_page(page);
}
}
#endif /* _LINUX_FSCRYPT_H */